On Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace, the Zangezur Corridor, and U.S. Mediation

 

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee. 

Tsukerman assesses the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace trajectory after the August 8 talks in Washington. She notes a memorandum of understanding, constitutional hurdles in Armenia, and momentum behind the Zangezur Corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and broader Eurasian trade. The United States is shifting from the sidelines to mediator and economic guarantor, while Russia and Iran seek to obstruct. Turkey’s alignment with Baku, EU energy needs, and China’s ties frame the stakes. Tsukerman outlines Armenia’s gradual pivot from CSTO, defence procurement challenges, heightened intelligence cooperation, and risks from revanchist actors that could imperil a durable settlement.

Interview conducted on August 16, 2025.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We are here with Irina Tsukerman, a New York attorney and geopolitical analyst. We will be discussing the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and regional stability. How is this conflict proceeding? How is it reshaping South Caucasus geopolitics? And what are the interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran, and various Western actors in this?

Irina Tsukerman: At least formally and on paper, the conflict is moving toward a conclusion. The gatherings in Washington last week were held on August 8, a symbolic date given the events of August 8, 2008, when Russia went to war with Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

This represented a significant step toward resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Several key points were achieved. First, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a memorandum of understanding, which advanced the negotiation process and formalized a framework for further talks and the resolution of remaining issues. The most significant obstacle remains Armenia’s constitution, which contains provisions—such as references to Nagorno-Karabakh—that contradict recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. Constitutional changes are required for normalization.

Another major issue that has already been resolved, and which had U.S. backing, is the recognition and creation of the Zangezur Corridor, envisioned as a trade and transport route. This corridor would connect mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia. More broadly, it would link Central Asia to Europe and Turkey, bypassing Russia and Iran, with U.S. involvement.

As part of this process, Azerbaijan and the United States agreed to create a working group for development projects in areas such as defence, security, and the economy. Restrictions under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which had previously limited U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, were addressed, enabling greater U.S. humanitarian and development engagement. The U.S. role in the Zangezur Corridor’s economic growth would mean a formal role in supply chains and infrastructure. Unlike earlier proposals that envisioned outside actors managing the corridor as “controllers,” the current arrangement is that the U.S. will act as a political and economic guarantor, helping Azerbaijan and Armenia administer it. The aim is to integrate the South Caucasus into a central trade hub and to contribute to normalization between Armenia and Turkey.

Another key outcome is that the United States is now positioning itself as a more potent mediator in the remaining negotiations. This is not the end of the conflict—an official peace treaty has yet to be signed—but the expectation is that progress will continue. The U.S. is no longer on the sidelines in a self-imposed absence from the diplomatic process; it will take a more active role in all aspects of the talks, becoming a visible partner and engaging trilaterally with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This also strengthens U.S. bilateral relations with both countries.

However, concerns remain that Russia and Iran will attempt to interfere and disrupt the process, as both have strategic reasons to prevent the Zangezur Corridor from functioning. Russia views it as a challenge to its regional influence, while Iran is wary of being bypassed by new trade routes that diminish its economic leverage.

Jacobsen: Now, regarding why Russia and Iran are against the corridor—what are the key reasons?

Tsukerman: First, both would lose out economically because international trade would bypass them and flow directly to Turkey. Turkey and Iran have an economic and political rivalry, even though they cooperate on many anti-Western issues. When it comes to day-to-day trade, tensions are evident, and Iran would prefer to benefit from any regional realignment rather than be excluded. However, its past threats to Azerbaijan have made that essentially a non-starter, which is why Azerbaijan is eager about the prospects of sidelining Iran.

As for Russia, relations with Azerbaijan have deteriorated significantly. Tensions escalated after an attack on an Azerbaijani civilian airplane, which killed passengers. Russia never formally admitted responsibility. It issued what was essentially a half-measure—an acknowledgment without either a genuine apology or an admission of error. Many believe the attack was deliberate because, on the same day, President Ilham Aliyev was flying out of Grozny back to Azerbaijan and may have been the real target of the operation.

Things only worsened afterward. Russia arrested numerous Azerbaijani businesspeople, tortured them, and several ended up dead. This led to an official confrontation with Azerbaijan, and Baku is expected to bring a legal case in international courts over the downing of the civilian aircraft.

There have also been language-related tensions. Azerbaijan has begun dismantling Russian-language associations—essentially shutting down organizations that were using language as a cover for pro-Russian activity. At the same time, Russia has targeted the Azerbaijani diaspora to influence the government’s pro-Western economic policies.

Moscow has also attacked Azerbaijan’s oil and gas deliveries to Ukraine, including pipelines affiliated with the Aliyev government, causing significant damage. There have been multiple such operations, and they are likely to continue.

To make matters worse, some Russian deputies—while drunk—publicly threatened to invade Azerbaijan. Baku’s unofficial response was, in essence: go ahead, make our day. Azerbaijan pointed out that it has Turkish and Israeli drones, while Russia, in that context, is increasingly seen as outdated, relying on “tanks and horses.”

Jacobsen: So, if there were any actual attack or invasion, is Azerbaijan prepared?

Tsukerman: Exceptionally so. The Azerbaijani military is well-prepared and battle-hardened. Any such action by Russia would be ill-advised.

Jacobsen: Was there not a case early in Putin’s presidency when Russia invaded a nearby territory?

Tsukerman: Yes, you are thinking of Chechnya. Russia launched two wars there and ultimately crushed the separatist movement, reasserting control.

Jacobsen: After Chechnya went from being essentially autonomous to coming under a Russian-backed puppet regime, what lessons did Azerbaijan and Armenia draw from that experience?

Tsukerman: Azerbaijan certainly learned a lesson. It is unlikely to host Russian troops anywhere near its territory in the foreseeable future. Armenia, by contrast, has hosted Russian forces since the 19th century. But now, Armenia is turning away and even expelling Russian troops, though it remains highly dependent on Russia for trade. That shift is a significant signal.

There have also been a couple of official coup claims from the Pashinyan government. One was characterized as a political coup attempt. Another was said to be linked to the Armenian Apostolic Church, which historically has functioned in many ways as a proxy for Russian influence. That said, the current head of the Church appears to be somewhat more pro-Western. Although Prime Minister Pashinyan accused him personally of involvement in that attempted coup, he has not presented credible evidence.

At the same time, there has been a crackdown on Russian-linked Armenian oligarchs. That in itself is not a bad thing; it demonstrates Armenia’s seriousness in dismantling entrenched, conservative, clannish, and revanchist political elites while advancing in a more reformist direction. However, this could backfire if the public perceives it as an attack on faith rather than on pro-Russian institutions. It could also backfire if carried out in a way that seems blatantly undemocratic or self-serving. Pashinyan is not known for being particularly transparent or democratic.

So even if these moves benefit the West by diminishing Russian influence, they could still backfire—either by allowing Russia to strengthen its position, or by producing a scenario similar to what happened in Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili. In Georgia, reforms were associated with corruption and authoritarianism, which ultimately led to the rise of the Georgian Dream party in 2012—a more pro-Russian faction with stronger economic appeal. What we do not want to see is a repeat of the Georgian scenario in Armenia.

Jacobsen: What about Iran’s role?

Tsukerman: Armenia and Iran have been cooperating fairly well. However, Armenia is now more likely to diversify further and expand trade with China. Azerbaijan is already doing this, partly as a signal to the West to pay more attention to the region. Unfortunately, neither the Biden administration nor the Trump administration took that bait, so both Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued building parallel relationships with China.

China is increasingly co-opting Azerbaijani media and forming official partnerships, and Armenia is likely to follow the same path. Iran, however, is concerned about Azerbaijan because it is a Shia-majority country but with a secular government and foreign policy. This is very different from Iran itself and from many Shia populations in the region, such as the Lebanese Shia and Iraqi Shia communities.

Jacobsen: You mentioned Iran’s concerns. Can you expand on why Azerbaijan represents such a threat to Iran’s regional position?

Tsukerman: Azerbaijan poses both a religious and an ethnic challenge to Iran. Unlike Iran, Azerbaijan does not recognize the doctrine of velayat-e faqih—the rule of the Islamic jurist. It has always had a different system, even before the Soviet era, offering a distinct Shia model that is secular and nationalist rather than theocratic. Iran, which has long used religion as a political tool to recruit followers as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan, is threatened by Azerbaijan’s example.

Its demographics also threatens Iran. It has a vast plurality of Azerbaijani and other Turkic peoples. Much of the Iranian population historically was not Farsi-speaking. Persian, as we know it, developed after the Arab invasions, written in the Arabic script and blending Indo-Persian traditions with heavy Turkic influence. Azerbaijanis are one of the largest Turkic groups within Iran.

While many Iranian Azerbaijanis are prominent in the military and political elite, many others remain fiercely independent, culturally closer to Baku than to Tehran, and feel discriminated against. Their language has been suppressed, their culture diminished. Large communities live near the border with Azerbaijan, around what is ironically called the “Bridge of Friendship.” When I visited, it was clear that the name is misleading. Iran threatened Azerbaijan with invasion in this area during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, moving weapons and tanks close to the border.

Iran has also attacked Azerbaijani diplomatic facilities through proxies. For example, there was an armed attack on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran in January 2023, blamed on a “lone madman,” but widely believed to have had official backing. In London, a pro-Iranian Shia group stormed Azerbaijan’s embassy in 2022. These incidents highlight serious tensions. There have also been direct threats from Iranian officials, prompting even Turkey to intervene diplomatically.

Jacobsen: That brings us to Turkey. How has Ankara shaped this dynamic?

Tsukerman: Turkey considers Azerbaijan a significant sphere of influence, especially economically. Politically, their positions sometimes diverge. For example, SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state oil company, has been targeted by mobs in Turkey angry over its energy partnership with Israel. Recently, SOCAR and Israel concluded a lucrative deal, which drew protests from pro-Palestinian groups in Turkey.

Culturally and strategically, however, Turkey and Azerbaijan are very close. During the Second Karabakh War, Turkish Bayraktar drones proved decisive. It is not true that Syrian mercenaries or terrorists were deployed on Azerbaijan’s behalf. That claim has no basis. First, it did not happen. Second, it would have been impractical: most Syrian fighters speak only Arabic, while Azerbaijan’s operational environment requires Azeri or Russian. They would have been ineffective.

The real advantage was the drones. They were a superior military technology that gave well-equipped Azerbaijan a decisive edge over the poorly equipped Armenian forces. This technological advantage, combined with Armenia’s lack of adequate support from Russia—neither politically nor militarily—was a key reason for Armenia’s defeat. 

Importantly, Pashinyan initiated the war without properly consulting Moscow, and that miscommunication deepened the rift between Yerevan and the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Turkey continues to pursue its goal of expanding its energy and strategic influence across the region.

There are pipelines and connectivity projects with Georgia, Hungary, and other countries—economic corridors that enhance regional integration. Azerbaijan is seeking greater influence overall, both politically and economically. These developments certainly benefit Turkey as well, and they also strengthen ties with the United States through interconnected diplomatic initiatives.

Jacobsen: What about Western actors—how are they positioning themselves?

Tsukerman: The European Union benefits from stability and security in the South Caucasus, primarily when the region is oriented in a more pro-Western direction. The EU particularly benefits from Azerbaijan’s oil and gas exports, which help reduce dependence on Russian energy. For example, southern European countries facing shortages now view Azerbaijan as a reliable and stable supplier. By contrast, Qatar has recently threatened to boycott Europe over various political disputes. That kind of volatility makes Azerbaijan’s energy partnership even more attractive.

Jacobsen: What about the best-case scenario—a multi-aligned, multilateral peace that works for everyone? Is that even remotely possible?

Tsukerman: Not with the current regimes in Russia and Iran. If Iran’s regime were to change into something less aggressive, that could open possibilities. But there are no guarantees. A return to a nationalistic monarchy, for instance, would not bode well for minorities, even if it might be less regionally aggressive. The best-case scenario would be a federated, secular, liberal republic. But that is highly unlikely given the current trajectory.

If an IRGC-led faction takes power, it would be even more aggressive. With Russia, meaningful change is also improbable. Even if Putin is removed or dies, his successors are likely to pursue a similar line. Without sweeping, forceful reforms overseen with Western support—something akin to a Peter the Great–style transformation combined with a post–Nuremberg trial reconstruction—you will not see a profound political shift. Russia’s centralized, authoritarian tradition has persisted for centuries, and it is not likely to change on its own without both a reformist-minded government and integrated Western assistance.

Jacobsen: Let us turn to Armenia. Suppose it shifts away from the CSTO toward deeper engagement with the EU and the U.S.—in areas such as defence procurement and training. How would that change the dynamic?

Tsukerman: That process is already underway. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s refusal to participate in the most recent CSTO events and joint sessions signals his move away from the alliance. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have also petitioned to withdraw from the OSCE Minsk Group. That group, which once included the United States, Russia, France, and Germany, failed to achieve any meaningful diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Its prestige has collapsed, just as the CSTO’s relevance has eroded.

This also indicates a genuine orientation toward Washington as the primary diplomatic intermediary. But when it comes to economic transformation, it will be a gradual process. Armenia cannot shift overnight to a fully American system. There is too much at stake, and risk guarantees would be necessary for businesses, especially given the potential for political instability and coups inside the country.

On weapons procurement, there are interoperability issues. Armenia has long been dependent on Russian and, more recently, Indian weapons. It has started purchasing French arms, much to Azerbaijan’s displeasure, but those deliveries have been slow. So far, there is more theoretical defence cooperation between France and Armenia than actual supplies. Meanwhile, Armenia still depends heavily on Russian prototypes. And U.S. weapons are expensive—Armenia is a poor country, so it is unclear how much it could realistically afford.

For now, the United States would likely need to bolster its presence through observers, ideally with EU support, to act as quasi-security guarantors against Russian aggression. That, however, raises concerns for Azerbaijan. They worry about revanchist, anti-Pashinyan factions gaining strength, cancelling peace agreements, and then using Western backing against Azerbaijan. That is a real risk that Western policymakers need to address more openly.

Jacobsen: So, intelligence cooperation will become more important?

Tsukerman: Yes. Intelligence-sharing will likely increase to identify potential threats. But here we run into a problem. Under the Trump administration, many intelligence officials were purged, and pro-Russian voices became prominent. Some within that administration even had connections with Russian- or Armenian-linked religious factions that are highly politicized, revanchist, and deeply opposed to Pashinyan. That leaves matters in an uncertain place unless the EU decides to get far more involved and counterbalance the risks of intelligence leaks from the U.S. side.

France, in particular, has generated distrust in Armenia. French policy has been heavily influenced by the Armenian diaspora and by pro-Russian lobbies connected to it. These diaspora networks do not necessarily support Yerevan’s current government. They view Pashinyan as weak for having lost the war and instead push unrealistic “Greater Armenia” ideas. While such projects are not feasible in the 21st century, they are being promoted by groups with money, political clout, and Russian support.

This brings another layer of interference. Some NGOs and groups funded by Russian and Armenian oligarchs have simultaneously contributed to infrastructure development in Armenia while also siphoning funds, fueling corruption, and advancing damaging nationalist agendas. These forces have obstructed the peace process rather than supported it.

Jacobsen: So Armenia is tilting West, Turkey is carefully balancing its position with Azerbaijan… Does this mean that, in the post-Soviet era, Russia’s footprint in the region is shrinking?

Tsukerman: Yes, Russia’s footprint is retracting, but not by choice. Moscow has had to pull many of its so-called peacekeepers from the South Caucasus due to logistical needs in Ukraine and because of its setbacks in Syria. Russia has already lost many of its top personnel in Ukraine, leaving behind poorly trained replacements with limited equipment. Its capacity for direct military involvement in the region has been diminished.

However, Russia’s ability to bribe, recruit spies, and employ terrorist tactics has not diminished—if anything, it has increased. Worse still, Russia has trained Iran in these same methods. Iran has been actively recruiting spies and agents in Azerbaijan and deploying them both against Azerbaijan itself and Israeli interests worldwide.

Azerbaijan’s security services, with support from Israeli counterparts, have been successful in uncovering and neutralizing many of these operatives domestically. Still, Iran has managed to operate with relative impunity, particularly in peripheral regions, making it difficult to track down everyone influenced by Iranian propaganda or infiltrated from across the border. The result is a complex, asymmetric security environment that is likely to intensify in the short term.

Jacobsen: What about guarantors such as the EU, U.S., and OSCE? Could they credibly sustain long-term peace negotiations?

Tsukerman: The OSCE is effectively finished in this role. The Minsk Group, which it oversaw, failed for decades to achieve progress, and both Baku and Yerevan have petitioned to withdraw from its framework. The OSCE itself has shown little enthusiasm for continuing with a process that dragged on fruitlessly for 30 years.

For a time, the European Union tried to take on a more direct role, but that effort fell apart once the EU shifted its focus to the Russian threat and the war in Ukraine. President Macron of France personally attempted to get involved, but Azerbaijan does not view him as a neutral party. Complicating matters further, other factions within France have interfered with Macron’s policies, weakening consistency.

That said, circumstances could change. For the first time in decades, France, Azerbaijan, and Armenia all face the same threat—Russia. That shared concern could potentially bring them closer together, depending on top-level commitments. Much will hinge on the French elections in 2027, when Macron’s term ends. His party already suffered significant losses in the recent snap elections, and both the radical left and radical right are on the rise. It is uncertain whether his successor will maintain France’s current anti-Russian stance.

Jacobsen: What about the U.S. side?

Tsukerman: The U.S. under Trump at least seems to view economic and personal benefit in acting as a guarantor. Washington would stand to gain not only from oil and gas cooperation but also from investments in digital infrastructure and broader regional projects. So there are economic incentives for the U.S. to remain engaged.

In addition to energy, there are also prospects for high-technology development and other forms of cooperation. On a more personal level, both Azerbaijan and Armenia pleased Trump by announcing they would push for a Nobel Peace Prize nomination for him. It’s unclear whether they meant they would nominate him directly or support existing nominations from elsewhere. Regardless, he views this as a positive gesture and as welcome publicity on top of what has otherwise been a series of diplomatic failures.

Because of this, he is likely to remain committed to the process for the time being. What happens once he leaves office, however, is uncertain. It’s not clear what direction U.S. policy will take afterward. By that point, the peace process may already be sufficiently formalized, and many of the issues causing political friction in Washington would likely be resolved. I presume that the next administration would probably maintain the course—unless there are radical political changes inside either Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Jacobsen: All right, let’s call that one a close. Thank you for your time. 

Tsukerman: Thank you very much for your time today, on what has been our most intensive week so far. See you then.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is the publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for The Good Men Project, International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN 0018-7399; Online: ISSN 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), A Further Inquiry, and other media. He is a member in good standing of numerous media organizations.

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